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ABSTRACT
Laboratory experimental methods are used to investigate the impacts of supply and/or
demand risks on prices, quantities traded, and earnings within forward and spot market
institutions. Random demand andlor supply shifts can be as much as 25 percent of the
expected equilibrium outcome. Nevertheless, results suggest that the spot or forward trad-
ing institution itself has a greater influence on market outcomes than the presence of risk
within the trading institution. Sellers tend to have relatively higher earnings in a spot
market than buyers, regardless of the risk. Total surplus, however, generally is greaterin
a forward market.
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Institutional Description
Concerns about risk management in agricul-
ture have been heightened by changes in the
1996 farm legislation that are designed to re-
duce agricultural subsidies and decouple gov-
ernment income payments to producers from
market prices and production. In place of gov-
ernment guarantees, forward contracts are a
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well-known means by which to mitigate price
risk, and are becoming increasingly common
in agriculture (Barkema, Drabenstott, and
Welch; Boehlje). One effect of increased for-
ward trading is fewer trades in the spot or cash
market. The spot market becomes thin. It is
not obvious that forward contracting, when
there is risk, is better than spot trading for
buyers and sellers as a group. Our work shows
that sellers fare better, in the sense that earn-
ings are higher, when they trade in a spot mar-
ket, and this happens in spite of large random
moves in demand and costs. This paper em-
pirically describes the behavior of agents fac-
ing alternative sources of risk in forward and
spot market institutions.
The literature sometimes refers to a for-
ward market, in its simplest form, as produc-
tion-to-demand. That is, price and quantity are
determined before production is completed.
The seller in such an institution faces risk be-
cause costs at the time of the agreement may160 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2000
be random. The buyer also faces risk in a for-
ward market. A food processor, for example,
as a forward buyer has locked in the input
price but still faces an unknown final demand
schedule. Hence forward contracting is never
risk free for agents in the market. This risk is
different than that experienced by buyers and
sellers in a spot market.
In a traditional spot market costs and final
demand are known, but the price and quanti-
ties exchanged are not known in advance of
the trade time. The spot market is a cash-and-
carry institution. The literature refers to it as
a cash market or advance production, Before
trades are made the production is held in in-
ventory, The spot supply schedule is perfectly
inelastic when there is no inventory carryover.
Thus, no more than what is produced can be
sold, and sellers may suffer the loss of unsold
inventory or take losses on units sold at prices
below their cost of production. Therefore, in-
ventory generates risk for the seller. This risk
is a significant issue for those producing nons-
torable commodities such as livestock, fruits,
vegetables and fluid milk.
The objective of this research is to compare
the impacts of supply andJor demand risks
within forward (production-to-demand) and
spot (advance production) markets as distinct
trading institutions. That is, the effects of ran-
dom movements in supply and demand are as-
sessed in a forward-only market and also in a
spot-only market. Attention is directed toward
measuring the impacts of alternative sources
of risk on relative trade prices and quantities
traded in these two market types. We collect
data from computerized laboratory markets. A
laboratory approach is warranted because data
from many forward and spot transactions in
naturally occurring markets are unavailable.
Moreover, it would be difficult to isolate and
analyze the impacts of alternative sources of
risk from data in natural markets, because out-
comes can result from a variety of uncon-
trolled and interacting factors, making it dif-
ficult to identify the influence of one factor.
We begin with the premise that all features
of the real-world cannot be incorporated into
an economic model or duplicated in a labo-
ratory setting. Thus, we recognize that the
study of the forward and spot markets in iso-
lation simplifies the actual marketplace. More-
over, our basic definitions of forward and spot
institutions do not strictly conform to those in
naturally occurring markets. There are, for ex-
ample, many varieties of forward contracts,
and inventory carryover is possible in some
spot markets. The intent, however, is to ini-
tially observe behavior in a very controlled
setting that captures the essential features of
spot and forward trading and the behavior of
economic agents trading in these institutions.
This approach also allows us to obtain base-
line results that can be compared with field
data or other experimental designs that add se-
lected elements of naturally occurring mar-
kets. The tradeoff for realism is control, which
is the strength of any laboratory approach.
Theoretical Considerations
We believe the expected value-variance frame-
work (Robison and Barry) provides a useful
analytical tool to investigate the theoretical
impacts of alternative sources of risk on mar-
ket behavior, when the supply and demand
schedules have a stochastic distribution. Con-
ditions for optimum quantity (q) and equilib-
rium price (p) for a buyer and seller facing
alternative sources of risk in a forward and a
spot market, along with the certainty state, are
presented in the Appendix.
The direction of the predicted price for the
risk-averse agent under alternative risk sce-
narios, as compared to the certainty case, de-
pends on whether the seller or buyer incurs a
cost associated with the source of risk. A ran-
dom supply schedule, based on the model pre-
sented in the Appendix, should prompt higher
prices in both the forward and spot markets
for risk-averse agents, compared to when sup-
ply is certain. This results from an increase in
the marginal cost due to the added cost of risk
for each seller.
If there are random shifts in the demand
schedule, then in a forward market the pre-
dicted price equilibrium is below that in the
case of certain demand. Demand, which is
modeled as a factor demand, decreases be-
cause of the additional cost of risk faced byMenkhaus et al.: Supply and Demand Risks in Forward and Spot Laboratory Markets 161
Table 1. Summary of the predicted effects of supply and/or demand risks on price and quan-
tities traded by type of market institution and source of risk for risk-averse agents
Predicted Effect
Relative to Certain Equilibrium (Base)
Institution Source of Risk Price Quantity
Forward None Base Base
supply ‘r J
Demand J J’
Supply and Demand ? J
spot None Base Base
supply ‘r
Demand ? :
Supply and Demand ? J’
?—Indeterminatedue to differences in risk preference between buyers and sellers, and relativevariancesin supply,
demand,and/orspot prices.
each buyer. Forward trade prices in the case
of both random demand and supply shifts are
dependent on the relative risk preferences of
buyers and sellers and the relative variances
of the supply and demand shocks and are
therefore indeterminate.
The impacts of random demand on trade
prices in a spot market are indeterminate ac-
cording to the model. The results depend on
the relative magnitudes of added costs asso-
ciated with risk of inventory loss for the seller
and demand risk for the buyer, which depends
on relative risk preferences of buyers and sell-
ers. The market price depends on the relative
decreases in supply and demand resulting
from the costs of risk to the seller and buyer,
respectively. Predictions of relative prices be-
tween forward and spot markets in the pres-
ence of risk also are difficult, again because
of the dependence on the relative risk attitudes
of agents and the relative variances due to sup-
ply and/or demand risks. The possibility of an
added cost due to the risk of loss in the spot
market, however, should prompt higher prices
under supply risk in the spot market for risk-
averse agents compared to prices in the for-
ward market with supply risk.
Quantities traded under all risky scenarios,
including risk of loss in the spot market, are
expected to be less than those under the cer-
tainty state for risk-averse decision makers,
because of the costs associated with risk. The
added risk of inventory loss in the spot market
should prompt lower quantities in the spot
market under the random supply scenario,
compared to the forward market with random
supply. Table 1 presents a summary of the pre-
dicted effects of risk on prices and quantities
traded in forward and spot institutions under
alternative risk scenarios as suggested by the
theory presented in the Appendix 1.
Experimental Methods and Procedures
Laboratory experimental methods (Plott;
Smith) are used to investigate differences in
trade prices and quantities traded under alter-
native sources of demand and supply risk in a
spot market and a forward market. A separate
forward laboratory market and a spot labora-
tory market with fixed supply and demand
schedules are two control treatments. We then
undertake (1) random supply, (2) random de-
mand, and (3) both random supply and de-
mand test treatments for the two market insti-
tutions. The basic design of the experiments
follows that used by Krogmeier et al. and is
summarized in Figure 1.
Three replications were conducted for each
of the control and test treatments. Thus, 24
laboratory market sessions were completed.
Consistent with previous studies (Krogmeier
et al.; Mestelman, Welland and Welland;
Noussair, Plott, and Reizman) four buyers and
four sellers participated in each market ses-
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Figure 1. Mechanics of the experiments
conducted for 15 three-minute periods. Partic-
ipants were not told the number of periods
over which trading would occur, to mitigate
the possibility of “unusual” behavior in the
last periods. Fifteen periods were deemed suf-
ficient to maximize subject experience, learn-
ing, and the chances of behavior settling down
into a stable pattern. The trading mechanism,
identical under all treatments, was a double
auction. This trading mechanism has been
used extensively in laboratory research and
does not require a large number of participants
to generate competitive outcomes (Davis and
Holt). A total of 192 students recruited pri-
marily from economics and business classes
participated.
The double auction trading mechanism
provides a means of price discovery, which is
informationally richer than other trading
mechanisms encountered in naturally occur-
ring agricultural markets (Krogmeier et al.).
Moreover, this type of trading mechanism is
at odds with the individual seller being a
price-taker (posted-bid auction) which char-
acterizes exchange in some agricultural mar-
kets, and private negotiation which is the pri-
mary method of trade in other markets. The





First, the double auction is an effi-
thoroughly documented trading in-
stitution, thus providing a baseline for future
work exploring other trading institutions. Sec-
ond, initial use of the double auction provides
for better control, in that we are better able to
isolate the interaction of market institution and
risk without incorporating yet another influ-
ence, e.g., possession of market power, which
has the potential of confounding the results.
Differences observed in behavior under alter-
native risk scenarios would likely be even
more prevalent in other trading institutions,
such as private negotiation, than in the double
action trading mechanism. This, however, is
an empirical issue.
Buyers participating in the forward and
spot control treatments were privately given a
table which listed the maximum redemption
(resale) values for each unit purchased; these
values were described to buyers as unit values.
Sellers were similarly provided with unit costs
for the control treatments. Earnings were de-
noted on a monetarily convertible currency
called tokens, with 100 tokens equaling $1.00.
Unit values and unit costs were identical for
each buyer and each seller, respectively. The
unit values and production costs used in eachMenkhaus et al.: Supply and Demand Risks in Forward and Spot Laboratory Markets 163
Table 2. Unit values and unit costs (tokens)
for the control treatments


























of the six sessions in the experiment are listed
in Table 2. Each buyer was allowed to pur-
chase, one at a time, up to eight units during
each trading period. The first unit purchased
in each period was the highest valued unit, the
second unit purchased was the second highest
valued unit, and so on. Likewise, each seller
was allowed to produce and sell, one at a time,
up to eight units in each trading period. The
first unit produced (sold) was the lowest cost
unit, the second unit produced (sold) was the
second lowest cost unit, and so on.
Each trading period under the forward mar-
ket began with a computerized double auction.
After a round ended, the computer automati-
cally calculated the earnings of the traders.
Production was never greater than the number
of units traded. Under the spot market, each
trading period began with a production phase,
during which each seller chose the number of
units he or she wished to produce for that par-
ticular period. The production cost associated
with these units was incurred before trading
began, reflecting the advance production na-
ture of a spot market. Trading in a double auc-
tion followed the production phase, identical
to that used in the forward treatment. Sellers
were allowed to sell only the number of units
which they had produced, that is, no inventory
carryover from one trading period to the next
was allowed. The cost of any unit not sold in
a particular period, therefore, represented a
sunk cost or a risk of loss to the seller.
Relying upon induced value theory (Smith
1976, 1982), the values and costs listed in Ta-
ble 2 constitute individual supply and demand
for each trading period. When summed hori-
zontally (over four sellers and four buyers)
competitive price theory predicts an equilib-
rium price of 80 tokens and units traded be-
tween 20 and 24 units per period, as shown in
the Appendix. This is the equilibrium for sta-
ble demand and supply conditions and repre-
sents a baseline against which we can compare
behavior when the supply and demand sched-
ules become random.
Earnings for a buyer on each unit pur-
chased equaled the redemption value of the
particular unit less the price paid to the seller.
Earnings for a seller on each unit sold equaled
the price received by the seller less the pro-
duction cost of the particular unit. Earnings
accumulated over the sequence of trading pe-
riods were displayed to each participant on his
or her computer system at the end of each
trading period. At the conclusion of each ses-
sion, participants were paid the cash equiva-
lent of these earnings.
Treatments incorporating random demand
and supply allowed unit resale values, unit
costs, or both, to vary by a random amount as
explained in the Appendix. Participants facing
risky resale values andlor costs were told that
these values could range between high and
low values of* 10 from the amounts displayed
on their record sheets. Subjects were informed
that the actual cost and resale value amounts
would be chosen randomly by the computer,
and had an equally likely chance of taking an
integer within the 21-token range. The entire
schedule for the seller or buyer shifted by the
random adjustment (or shift parameter) select-
ed by the computer.
Each participant was given an initial token
balance of 700 ($7.00) at the beginning of a
session. This initial balance was deemed nec-
essary in the spot markets, since sellers had to
incur production costs before being given the
opportunity to earn profit from sales. An ad-
ditional concern was that the initial endow-
ment should be large enough to preclude the
possibility of individual bankruptcy early in
the session. This was a concern for sellers in
the spot market, where a failure to sell could
result in large losses. In order that symmetry
between buyers and sellers and across treat-164 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Apri12000
ments be maintained, the initial balance was
given to all participants under all treatments.
The average individual earnings over all mar-
ket experiment sessions was $28.32. Partici-
pants spent between two and two and a half
hours in a session. This included an instruction
and demonstration period before actual trad-
ing. Different redemption and cost values were
used in the demonstration sessions than in the
actual trading sessions.
The double auction in each trading period
continued for a maximum of three minutes,
which was ample time to conduct all trades
desired by participants. At the conclusion of
each trading period, each subject’s screen
showed his or her purchase (sale) prices and
earnings on each unit purchased (sold). Also
provided was the average price paid (received)
for all units exchanged by the participant. The
individual’s beginning balance, total earnings
for the period, and ending balance (denoted in
both tokens and dollars) also were summa-
rized. For the purpose of reinforcing the sa-
liency of the reward structure, participants
were asked to record this information on re-
cord sheets at the conclusion of each trading
period.
Results
The experiments yielded observations on trade
prices, quantities traded, and earnings by sell-
ers and buyers. These data are summarized
graphically and analyzed. Our statistical tests
compare the different treatment means for
prices, quantities, and earnings. The null and
alternative hypotheses for treatments i and j
are
Ho: l-+= p,, foralli#j
Ha: p, # p, for all i # j,
These are numerous methods for making such
multiple comparisons including the least sig-
nificant difference method, Duncan’s multiple
range test, the Newman-Keuls test, and Tu-
key’s test. Duncan’s multiple range test is used
in this study. The choice is based on the rel-
ative power of this test and its performance in
detecting true differences in Monte Carlo sim-
ulation studies (Carmer and Swanson), 1
Trade Prices
Graphical representations of mean average
trade prices for each trading cycle and the
three treatments in the forward and spot mar-
kets are illustrated in Figures 2 and 3, respec-
tively. Prices during the initial periods in both
the forward and spot markets, under all treat-
ments, exhibit considerable variability. Two
price series, notably forward-random supply
(FRS) and spot-random both supply and de-
mand (SRB), do not appear to stabilize at a
consistent level until after nine or ten trading
periods, Prices, in general, are relatively more
stable during the latter five cycles. These ten-
dencies likely reflect a learning phenomenon
by traders as the experiment proceeds (Fried-
man and Sunder, p. 30).
Prices for each treatment in the forward
market, except for those generated in the ran-
dom supply treatment (FRS), stabilize at pric-
es slightly below the predicted competitive
equilibrium of 80 tokens, We would expect
from the theory that the risk associated with
random demand in the forward market (FRD)
will reduce price. Buyers facing demand risk
are more conservative in their bids. Also, the
theoretical model predicts prices to be higher
under supply risk (FRS), which is consistent
with the trends illustrated in Figure 2. In gen-
eral, however, there does not appear to be
much difference in prices among the treat-
1Risk attitudes of each individual participating in
the test treatments were assessed through a self-admin-
istered choice experiment. Each game involved a
choice between an Option A which yielded $2.50 with
certainty and a risky Option B that paid either $5.00
or $0.00. Option B differed from the certainty option
(Option A) in that the probability of winning $5.00
increased monotonically from 10 percent in the first
choice game to 90 percent in the ninth game. The pay-
off was determined randomly by first choosing the
game and then the payment for Option B (either $0.00
or $5.00). Average risk attitude scores for sellers and
buyers over the three replications for each treatment
ranged from 4.75 (slightly risk seeking) to 6.42 (risk
averse). Risk attitude scores for all participants in the
experiments resulted in an overall mean of 5.43, sug-
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Figure 2. Average price in FRD, FRS, FRB, and FC
ments in either the forward or spot institu-
tions.
Prices in the spot market under alI treat-
ments are noticeably higher than those in the
forward market (Figures 2 and 3). Spot prices
for each treatment appear to asymptotically
approach an equilibrium price above the com-
petitive equilibrium. The distinguishing fea-
ture of the spot market, compared to the for-
ward, is advance production and the associated
the inventory is not sold. The added cost of
this risk, as suggested by the theoretical mod-
el, encourages trades at higher prices than in
a production-to-demand setting. Buyers rec-
ognize that they face a fixed supply and bid
at higher prices in the spot market, compared
to the forward case.
Duncan’s multiple range test was conduct-
ed using mean average prices across the three
replications from the combined last five trad-
possibility of
8 ‘c &
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Table 3. Results of Duncan’s multiple range
test for average mean period prices (tokens)
by treatment, periods 11–15, three replications
Treatment Mean Price*
Trading Random Random Random
Institution Control Demand Supply Both
spot 84.45” 85.31’ 81.72’h’ 84.33ab
Forward 77.70’ 78.80hc 81.15”” 77.59
~ = 0,10, d.f. = 16, MSE = 14.16
Critical range of ranked means (number of means):
5.36 (2); 5.64 (3); 5.81 (4); 5.92 (5); 5.99 (6);
6.05 (7); 6.09 (8)
* Means with the same lelter are not significantly differ-
ent.
to use the last five periods for the statistical
analysis is admittedly subjective. We justify
our decision as follows. The primary purpose
for conducting the experiments for multiple
periods is to provide agents with the oppor-
tunity to learn and to adjust to the incentives
created in the experimental markets. This
takes time, particularly as agents face rapid
and frequent interchange in a computerized
auction. We believe time of adjustment is in-
creased when we add random supply and/or
demand shifts. The effects of learning and ex-
perience can be seen in the behavior of prices
in Figures 2 and 3, as previously mentioned.
Agents appear to learn relatively quickly dur-
ing some treatments. Prices, on average, sta-
bilize after about five periods, In some treat-
ments, such as in FRS and SRB, it apparently
took agents longer to iterate toward a relative-
ly stable price level. Thus, we chose the last
five periods to calculate means for Duncan’s
multiple range test to maintain consistency
across treatments. At the same time, five pe-
riods provide ample observations to reduce the
effects of any slight aberrations which may
have occurred during those periods.z Results
are presented in Table 3.
2A Duncan’s multiple range test of the means of
average trade prices generated over the three replica-
tions for periods 1–5, 6–10, and 11–15 reveal no sig-
nificant (a = O.10) differences in prices for the latter
two groups of periods for all treatments. From a sta-
tistical perspective, we could have chosen either the
final five periods, the middle five periods, or these two
combined.
Mean average trade prices across all treat-
ments in the spot market are generally higher,
ranging from 85.31 tokens in SRD to 81.72
tokens in SRS, than those in the forward mar-
ket which range from 81.15 in FRS to 77.59
in FRB. Prices generated in the spot markets
and prices in the forward market under supply
risk (FRS) are not significantly different (a. =
O.10) from each other. Prices in all forward
market treatments, along with those from the
SRS treatment, are not significantly different.
Thus, the impact of supply and/or demand risk
on prices within the two market institutions
does not appear to be overwhelming, as sug-
gested by the graphical analysis.
Spot market prices in all treatments, except
for supply risk, are significantly higher than
those from the corresponding treatment in the
forward market. We believe these differences
reflect the importance of the cost associated
with risk of inventory loss in the spot market,
even when random demand and/or supply
shifts can be as much as 25 percent of the
expected equilibrium outcome as in our ex-
periments. The presence of supply risk, on the
other hand, seems to partially wash out or sub-
stitute for the effect of inventory risk, as prices
between the spot and forward markets with
uncertain supply are almost identical. Supply
risk prompts sellers to produce less which re-
duces the possibility of inventory loss.
Quantities Traded
Average quantities traded during latter periods
within each market setting (forward and spot)
are consistently lower for treatments involving
risk, compared to the control treatments (Fig-
ures 4 and 5). This result is consistent with
that predicted by theory. The treatments in-
corporating both demand and supply risks
yields the least number of units traded in both
the forward and spot markets. Quantities trad-
ed in the spot market tend to be lower than
those traded in the forward market, particular-
ly for the random supply and demand scenar-
ios. The effects of learning are evident during
the early periods for each treatment, but as
with prices, quantities traded tend to stabilize
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Figure 4. Average quantity traded in FRD, FRS, FRB, and FC
price series, there does not appear to be a great
difference in quantities traded for each treat-
ment within a market institution.
Table 4 reports average quantities traded
over three replications for periods 11 through
15 combined for each treatment. Units traded
range from 21.73 in the forward control treat-
ment to 17.87 in the spot market with both
supply and demand risks. Quantities traded,
consistent with prices, appear to be more af-
fected by trading institution than by supply
andlor demand risks within either the forward
or spot market. Average quantities traded in
the forward market over the last five periods
ranged from 19.67 (FRB) to 21.73 (F Control).
Average quantities traded in the spot market
over the same period ranged from 17.87
(SRB) to 20.13 (S Control).
The results of Duncan’s multiple range test
suggest that units traded in the forward market
with demand risk (FRD) are significantly (a
= O.10) greater than units traded in the de-
mand risk treatment in the spot market (SRD).
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Table 4. Results of Duncan’s multiple range
test for mean period quantities traded by treat-
ment, periods 11–15, three replications
loss and supply risk tends to offset their com-
bined influences.
Treatment Mean Quantities Traded*
Trading Random Random Random
Institution Control Demand Supply Both
spot 20.13”bc 18.47c~ 19.13bC’ 17.87’
Forward 21.73’ 20.67’b 20.2tYh’ 19.67b~
a = 0.10, d.f. = 16, MSE = 1.23
Critical range of ranked means (number of means):
(2); 1.66 (3); 1.71 (4); 1,74 (5); 1.76 (6); 1.78
(7); 1.79 (8)
* Means with the same letterare not significantlydiffer-
ent.
FRB than in SRB. The effect of risk on quan-
tities traded in the spot market in the case of
both supply and demand risks (SRB), in fact,
is greater than the effects of all risk scenarios
on units traded in the forward market. Risk,
as indicated in the theoretical models, increas-
es the marginal costs for both risk averse buy-
ers and sellers. This results in lower equilib-
rium quantities traded under the conditions of
random supply and/or demands, as generally
observed from the experimental data. The ad-
ditional cost associated with the risk of inven-
tory loss in the spot market further increases
costs and reduces quantities traded (although
not significantly), compared to the forward
market.
A result which emerges from the analyses
of price and quantity data generated from the
experiments is that the influence of trading in-
stitution is more dominant than the random
shifts in supply or demand. That is, there gen-
erally is a significantly greater difference in
prices and quantities traded between forward
and spot markets under corresponding sources
of risk than within each institution with dif-
ferent risks. Thus, the cost associated with the
risk of inventory loss in the spot market seems
to dominate the costs of supply or demand
risks, even when demand or supply shifts can
be as much as 25 percent of the expected equi-
librium outcome. An exception to this general
conclusion is the case of supply risk, where
the interdependence of the risk of inventory
Buyer and Seller Earnings
A source of earnings variability in the test
treatments is due to the random shifts in unit
values or unit costs. This source of variance
must be removed, in order to compare the
earnings data across treatments. Adjusted av-
erage earnings can be calculated by determin-
ing the average level of the shift parameters
over the periods of analysis for each replica-
tion and multiplying this by the average quan-
tity traded in the corresponding replication.
This total correction factor can then be added
to or subtracted from the unadjusted or ob-
served total earnings to obtain adjusted earn-
ings. Average buyer and/or seller earnings can
be adjusted by dividing the total correction
factor by fours The effects of the random shift
variable on total and buyer and seller earnings
are reflected in the differences between the un-
adjusted and adjusted means reported in Ta-
bles 5 and 6. Demand and/or supply risk, as
expected, contribute to the variation in earn-
ings, as indicated in the comparison of the
mean square errors (MSE) for unadjusted and
adjusted earnings. The following discussion
focuses on the adjusted earnings.
The results of Duncan’s multiple range test
for the total adjusted earnings for buyers and
sellers for all treatments are reported in Table
5. Total surpluses in the spot market, in gen-
eral, are less than in the forward market. Earn-
ings under alternative sources of risk in each
‘ An example calculation of adjusted average earn-
ings follows. The shift parameters for periods 11
through 15 in the first replication of the FRD treatment
are 8, – 1, 4, 4 and –9, yielding an average of 1.20.
The average units traded during the last five periods of
replication one of the FRD treatment is 20.20. The to-
tal correction factor is 24.24 (20.20. 1.20). This means
that, on average, demand shifted to favorably influence
earnings. Thus, the adjusted average total earnings is
unadjusted average total earnings minus the correction
factor or 1220.80 – 24.24 = 1196.56. The correction
factor for buyer earnings (seller earnings are not di-
rectly affected by the random shift in demand) is 24.24
divided by 4 (the number of buyers) or 6.06. Adjusted
average buyer earnings for the first replication of FRD
for periods 11 through 15 is 161.7 – 6.06 = 155.64.Menkhaus ez al.: Supply and Demand Risks in Forward and Spot Laboratory Markets 169
Table 5. Results of Duncan’s multiple range test for mean total period unadjusted and adjusted
earnings (tokens) by treatment, periods 11-15, three replications
TreatmentMean UnadjustedEarnings*
Trading Random Random Random
Institution Control Demand supply Supply & Demand
spot 1147.33b 1127.93’ 1191.13b 1125.47b
Forward 1189,33’b 1257.601 1158.13’b 1166.07’b
a = 0.10, d.f.= 16, MSE = 4117.63
Critical range of ranked means (number of means): 91.50 (2); 96.20 (3); 99.00 (4); 100.90 (5); 102.20
(6); 103.10 (7); 103.80 (8)
TreatmentMean UnadjustedEarnings**
Random Random Random
Control Demand supply Supply & Demand
spot 1147.33b’ 1149,51’b’ 1170.o&b 1127.25’
Forward 1189.33’ 1191.07” 1169.62’b 1164. 17dbc
Critical range of ranked means (number of means): 37.37 (2); 39.29 (3); 40.45 (4); 41.22 (5); 41.76 (6);
42.14 (7); 42.41 (8)
* Unadjustedmeanearningsreflecttheeffects of therandomshiftvariablesfor supply and/or demand. Means with the
same letter are not significantly different.
** Adjusted mean earnings remove the effects of the random supply and/or demand shift variables. Again, meanswith
the same letter are not significantly different.
market institution as a percent of total possible
earnings (1200 tokens) range from about 94
percent in the SRB treatment to about 99 per-
cent in the FRD and F Control treatments. To-
tal earnings in the FRD and F Control treat-
ments are significantly (a = O.10) higher than
earnings in the S Control and SRB treatments.
The forward market tends to be more efficient
than the spot market regardless of the source
of risk. The influence of the combined risks
associated with supply and demand, as ex-
pected, has the greatest impact on total earn-
ings in each market type, compared to indi-
vidual supply or demand risks.
Average adjusted earnings for periods 11
through 15 and three replications for buyers
and sellers (Table 6) range from 118.03 (buy-
er–SRD) to 169.30 (seller–SRD). Buyers fare
significantly better in the F Control, FRB and
FRD treatments than in corresponding spot
market treatments. Seller earnings between
corresponding market and risk treatments are
not significantly different. Sellers fare signifi-
cantly better than buyers in the SRD, S Con-
trol and SRB treatments. Seller earnings, in
general, are higher when they trade in a spot
market, even when there are large random
moves in demand and supply and demand,
Summary and Implications
A key distinction between a spot market and
a forward market is the presence of risk of
inventory loss in the former market type. The
results of this study suggest that this risk, in
general, has a greater impact on trade prices
and quantities traded than risks associated
with variation in supply and/or demand, at
least when the two market types are in isola-
tion. Sellers in a spot market seek higher pric-
es for their product, compared to sellers in a
forward market, to offset costs associated with
the risk of loss. The impacts of this risk also
are observed in the form of lower quantities
in the spot market relative to the forward.
Buyers potentially react to the fixed and in-
elastic supply in the spot market by increasing
competitive bidding and driving prices up
(Krogmeier et al.).
The analysis of relative buyer and seller
earnings across market types for the same
treatment suggests buyers tend to fare better170 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2000
Table 6. Results of Duncan’s multiple range test of mean period earnings (tokens) by treatment
for buyers and sellers, periods 11–15, three replications
TreatmentMean UnadjustedEarnings*
Random Supply &
Trading Control Random Demand Random Supply Demand
Institution Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller
spot 123.58bc 163.25’ 112.6bC 169.30’ 138.47’b’ 159.32” 121.48h’ 159.88’
Forward 159.92s’ 137.42’bL 170.90’ 143.5W” 141.62b’ 147.92’b 168.27’ 123.25”
a = 0.10, d.f. = 32, MSE = 473.04
Critical range of ranked means (number of means): 30.08 (2); 31.74 (3); 32.79 (4); 33.53 (5); 34.08
(6); 34.50 (7); 34.83 (8); 35.10 (9); 35.31 (10); 35.49 (11); 35.63 (12); 35.25 (13); 35.84 (14); 35.92
(15); 35.98 (16)
Treatment Means Adjusted Earnings* *
Random Supply &
Control Random Demand Random Supply Demand
Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller Buyer Seller
spot 123.5&” 163.25’b 118.03” 169.30 138.47’’’” 154.03”h 121.53’(1 161.27’”
Forward 159.92’” 137.42bc<’ 154.5 (F’ 143.50’b”! 141.62’b’” 150.72’b’ 158.00’b 133.83b”l
a = 0.10, d.f. = 32, MSE = 341.40
Critical range of ranked means (number of means): 25.55 (2); 26.96 (3); 27.86 (4); 28.49 (5); 28.95
(6); 29.31 (7); 29.59 (8); 29.82 (9); 30.00 (10); 30.15 (1 1); 30.27 (12); 30.37 (13); 30.45 (14); 30.51
(15); 30.57 (16)
x uni,dj~s~~d mean~arning~reflecttheeffects Of (he random shift variables tor supply amik)r demarrcl.Means with the
same letter are not significantly ctifferent,
~:~AdlUsted mean earnjngs relnove the effects Of the random shift supply and/or demand shift Variahlcs. Main, means
with the same letter are not s]gniticantly different
in the forward market than in the spot market.
Seller earnings, on the other hand, are not sig-
nificantly different between the forward and
spot markets under corresponding risk treat-
ments. Seller earnings, however, tend to be
higher in the spot market than earnings for
buyers in the spot market. The forward market
generally is more efficient than the spot mar-
ket, as measured by the percent of total surplus
extracted relative to the total possible surplus.
Structural change and risk are two interre-
lated issues facing agriculture. Increased for-
ward contracting and higher vertical coordi-
nation is occurring in almost all sectors of the
food industry. Changes in farm legislation to
shift risk bearing from the public sector to the
private sector, along with increased globaliza-
tion, will contribute to increased risk faced by
individual agents. The results of this study, at
least for the levels of risk associated with sup-
ply and/or demand, suggest a greater influence
due to structural change issues than from risk.
That is, there seems to be a greater impact on
market prices, quantities, and earnings be-
tween the forward and spot institutions than
among the risk sources within an institution
type.
Results from the experiments conducted in
the study point to several possible implications
for agriculture. Overall earnings to buyers or
processors will be greater in forward contract-
ing institutions compared to traditional spot
markets. This disparity likely will be more
prevalent in market institutions which are less
efficient than the double auction used in the
experiments reported in this study. At cyclical
lows in prices, increased political pressure
may be brought to bear to regulate forward
contracting practices. While sellers would re-
ceive better prices in spot markets, the risk ofMenkhaus et al.: Supply and Demand Risks in Forward and Spot Laboratory Markets 171
loss compounded by price risk makes the for-
ward market attractive to risk-averse sellers.
The trade-off sellers make by doing this is a
transfer of wealth from sellers to buyers under
a forward contract dominated marketplace,
relative to one dominated by spot markets.
This will exacerbate the current structural
change trends in agriculture and likely will in-
crease concerns of those who oppose the in-
dustrialization of agriculture, Thus, while
there may be less government in agriculture of
the future, there may be need for more regu-
lation. Moreover, end consumers may be better
off if the increased surpluses from forward
markets relative to spot markets, coupled with
larger quantities, are passed on from interme-
diate buyers.
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APPENDIX
Economic Models Incorporating Selected
Risks
Risk was incorporated into our experiments by
varying unit costs for sellers (minimum willingness
to accept) and/or unit resale values for buyers
(maximum willingness to pay) by a random vari-
able. We attach a random component, e and v re-
spectively, to the unit cost and unit resale value
functions that has a uniform distribution (all inte-
gers between – 10 and + 10). Thus, the probability
distribution of ~ and v each is a discrete uniform
distribution with mean zero and variance 33.33.
Profit maximization conditions for both the buyer
and seller under certainty, supply risk, demand risk,
and both supply and demand risks in both forward
and spot markets are derived from the certainty
equivalent of each relevant profit expression [Rob-
ison and Barry]. The certainty equivalent of profit
is expected risky profit less the risk premium at
which the decision maker is indifferent between the
risky and riskless alternatives.
Forward Market—No Risk
Seller profit is given by n = pq – C(q), where p
is price, q is units traded, and C(q) is total cost.
The first-order condition for the seller requires MR~
= p = c’(q) = Me,$, where MR and MC are mar-
ginal revenue and marginal cost, respectively. Buy-
er profit is given by n = R(q) – pq, where R(q) is
total revenue. The first order condition requires
MR, = R ‘(q) = p = MC.. The total cost and total
revenue equations from the experiment can be used
to compute the predicted equilibrium price and
quantity for the individual seller and buyer. The to-
tal cost equation is 25q + 5q2 and the total revenue
equation is 135q – 5q2. Solving 25 + 10q = 135
– 10q yields an equilibrium quantity for the indi-
vidual agents of q = 5.5, and because units must172 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, April 2000
be whole the equilibrium is between 5 and 6 units.
Multiplying by four buyers and four sellers results
in an equilibrium market quantity of between 20
and 24 units. Tbe equilibrium price is 80 tokens.
Spot Market—No Risk
The spot market, by definition, occurs after the pro-
duction decision. Thus, there is the possibility for
the seller to lose all, or part of, tbe cost of produc-
tion (risk of loss). Costs become sunk. Effectively,
this is a risk associated with price in the spot mar-
ket. Expected price in the spot market is E(p + w)
= p where w is a random variable with expected
value zero and variance u;,. The distribution of w
is assumed to be such that price cannot be negative.
Expected profit is E(m) = pq – C(q) with variance
q2u~. The certainty equivalent of the profit expres-
sion, following Robison and Barry, is m,<,= pq –
C(q) – [(k, /2)(q2u~)]. The first order condition for
the seller requires MR,Y = p = C ‘(q) + h,$qu~ =
A4Cs and for the buyer is MR~ = R ‘(q) = p = MC~.
The additional cost associated with risk of inven-
tory loss should result in reduced quantity for a
risk-averse agent (is > O) in the spot market com-
pared to the forward where this risk is not present.
Prices in an advance production setting are expect-
ed to be higher, relative to a production-to-demand
or forward market, because of a decrease in supply
resulting from the added cost associated with the
risk of inventory loss.
Forward Market—Supply Risk
Expected total cost for the seller with supply risk
is E(C(q) + eq) = C(q), where e is a discrete uni-
form random variable as previously defined. Ex-
pected profit for the seller is E(T) = pq – C(q)
with variance q*a$. The certainty equivalent of the
profit expression is nC, = pq – C(q) – [(k,/
2)(q2u$)]. The first-order condition for the seller re-
quires MR~ = p = C’(q) + u,Yqu$ = MCs and for
the buyer is MRn = R ‘(q) = p = MCfl. For the risk
averse decision maker, price offered (p) must offset
the cost of risk associated with supply risk. In the
market, equilibrium quantities traded should be less
than those for the risk-free case and prices traded
should be higher.
Forward and Spot Markets—Demand
Rkk
Expected total revenue for the buyer with demand
risk is E(R(q) + vq) = R(q) where u is a discrete
uniform random variable as previously defined. Ex-
pected profit for the buyer is E(T) = R(q) – pq
with variance qjuj. The certainty equivalent of the
profit expression is IT,, = R(q) – pq – [(h,j/
2)(q2uj)]. The first order condition requires MRB =
R ‘(q) = p + k“qcr; = MC~. The first order condi-
tion for the seller is MR,J = p = C’(q) = MC~ and
MRS = p = C’(q) + u~qu~, = MCS-, for the forward
and spot markets, respectively. Quantities traded
under demand risk in each institution are expected
to be reduced. Price is expected to be lower in the
case of demand risk for the risk-averse decision
maker in the forward market, relative to the risk-
free case. The predicted price in the spot market is
indeterminate, as it depends on the relative risk
preferences of buyers and sellers and the relative
magnitudes of variances associated with demand
risk and spot price. The first order conditions are
identical in both the forward and spot markets for
a buyer facing demand risk.
Forward Market=Supply and Demand
Risks
The first-order conditions in the case of supply and
demand risks in the forward market are as derived
above.
Supply (Seller)
MRs = p = C’(q) + hsqu~ = MC~
Demand (Buyer)
MRR = R’(q) = p + k,qu: = MC~
Quantities traded are expected to be less in this case
than for the no risk case. Expected price, however,
depends on the relative risk preference between
buyers and sellers in the market and the relative
variances of movements in supply and demand.
Spot Market-Supply Risk
Expected profit for the seller in the spot market
with supply risk is E(n) = pq – C(q) with variance
z _ zq2PGWvC where p is the correlation q%;, + q“cre
between w and G The certainty equivalent of the
profit expression is r<, = pq – C(q) – [(k, /2)(u~)].
The first order condition both for the seller requires
MR., = p = C’(q) + ks(qu~ + quj – 2PU,,U,,,) =
MC~ and for the buyer is MRB = R ‘(q) = p = MCfl.
Quantities traded should be reduced. Price is ex-
pected to be higher in this case for the risk-averse
agent relative to when there is no supply risk.Menkhaus et al.: Supply and Demand Risks in Forward and Spot L.uboratory Markets 173
Spot Market—Supply and Demand Risks
The first-order conditions for supply and demand




= c’(q)+ As(qu; + qu: – 2qpuwuE)
= MC,
Demand (Buyer)
MR~ = R’(q) = p + h~qu: = MC~
Quantities traded, as in the case of supply and de-
mand risk in the forward market, are expected to
be less, compared to the no risk case. Expected
price depends on the relative risk preference be-
tween buyers and sellers in the market, along with
the relative variances in the movement in supply
and demand and the variance in spot price.